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conflict 
in a peacekeeping 
organization: unficyp
by
Charles C. Moskos, Jr.
Department of Sociology 
Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois
Prepared for the World Congress of 
Sociology at Varna, September 14-19, 1970
An analysis of the formal organization of the United Nations 
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Arguing that it 
is in the comprehension of external and internal sources of 
conflict that much of the underlying structure of UNFICYP 
is revealed, the author has used the conflict framework as 
the interpretative variable. This framework is defined as the 
ascertainment of «the kinds of differentiation within an organ­
ization and the examination of the amount and types of conflict 
deriving from these internal cleavages». This assessment is 
then evaluated in terms of its application to mono-national 
military organizations. [j. chernoff]
On March 4, 1964, the United Nations Security Coun­
cil unanimously adopted a resolution which recom­
mended the establishment of an international force to 
keep the peace in Cyprus. The eastern Mediterranean 
island-republic was in a state of virtual civil war as 
fighting broke out between its Greek and Turkish 
communities. The first units of the United Nations 
Force in Cyprus—UNFICYP—arrived on the is­
land three weeks later. A new episode in the chechered 
history of international peacekeeping forces was about 
to begin.1
The mission of UNFICYP (pronounced «ΟΟΝ feh 
sip») defined by the 1964 Security Council resolution 
was «...to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of 
fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the main­
tenance and restoration of law and order and a return 
to normal conditions».2 Subsequent semi-annual re­
solutions passed by the Security Council have kept 
the United Nations Force in Cyprus in being through 
the time of this writing (summer, 1970). Although 
the basic dispute between Greeks and Turks on Cy­
prus has remained unresolved, UNFICYP has made 
positive progress in its primary task of pacifying the 
Cypriot inter-communal war. UNFICYP, moreover, 
has also made a substantial contribution in restoring 
Cyprus to conditions of normal order and stability. 
In at least these respects, the United Nations Force in 
Cyprus contrasted favorably with other U.N. peace­
keeping forces in the Congo and Middle East. The 
Secretary General has thus been able with accuracy to 
term UNFICYP a «successful» peacekeeping opera­
tion.3
1. All researches in this area must begin with the compre­
hensive bibliography prepared by AlbertLegault, Peace-Keep­
ing Operations, Paris: International Information Center on 
Peace-Keeping Operations, 1967. Since that date, see Rosalyn 
Higgins, United Nations Peace-Keeping 1946-1967, Voi. 1, 
London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1969; Alan James, The politics of Peace­
keeping, London: Chatto and Windus for the Institute of 
Strategic Studies, 1969; and especially the excellent case study 
by Janies A. Stegenga, The United Nations Force in Cyprus, 
Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1968. The best intror 
duction to the Cyprus crisis is Robert Stevens, Cyprus, A 
Place of Arms, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966.
2. United Nations Document, S /5575, March 4, 1964, para­
graph 5.
3. United Nations Document, S /7350, June 10, 1966, para­
graph 172.
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the organization of UNFICYP
UNFICYP had a total strength in 1970 of approxi­
mately 3,700 persons: 3,500 military personnel, and 200 
Chilian staff. (See appendices 1 and 2 for an organ­
izational chart of UN Fl CYP, and a breakdown of con­
stituent units by nationality.) The civilian side consist­
ed of an official staff of about ten persons: the Special 
Representative to the Secretary General, political 
and legal advisors, an administrative section, and a 
public information office. These U.N. civilian officials 
were serving indeterminate tours in Cyprus. About 
another 20 or so persons on routine U.N. field service 
tours acted as secretaries or drivers to the civilian 
staff. Another civilian component of the U.N. pres­
ence in Cyprus were the 175 police officers who 
made up the United Nations Civilian Police (UN 
Cl VPOL). Drawn in almost equal numbers from Aus­
tralia, Austria, Denmark, and Sweden, UNCIVPOL 
performed liaison functions between the police forces 
oftheGreek CypriotandTurkish Cypriotcommunities.
It was the military side, however, which was by far 
and away the numerically dominant component of 
UNFICYP and which gave the United Nations pres­
ence in Cyprus its distinguishing quality. The bulk 
of the military personnel were found in six national 
contingents, each consisting of approximately 500 
officers and men. These national contingents were 
drawn from Canada, Denmark, Finland, Great Brit­
ain, Ireland, and Sweden: respectively referred to as 
Cancon, Dancon, Fincon, Britcon, Ircon, and Swed- 
con. Each of the national contingents was charged 
with responsibility for a specific region of Cyprus. 
Depending on the locale of their deployment, the na­
tional contingents performed duties such as: guarding 
«Green Lines» (i.e. de facto borders between Greek 
and Turkish communities within cities); manning out­
posts—«O.P.’s»—on the edge of Turkish enclaves in 
the countryside; patroling both Greek and Turkish 
Cypriot areas to monitor military movements and 
buildups, and supervising daily automobile convoys 
of Greek civilians through Turkish-controlled areas.
Each of the six national contingents were all similar 
in their being organized along the lines of reduced 
infantry battalions. They also shared in common a 
six-month tour of duty in Cyprus. There were, how­
ever, major differences between the national contin­
gents in their recruitment and formation. Britcon and 
Cancon were ongoing integral military units com­
posed entirely of regular career soldiers. Such units 
as the «Pompadours» of Great Britain and the «Black 
Watch» of Canada were made up of men who had 
soldiered together before coming to Cyprus and would 
presumably continue to do so afterwards. Dancon, 
Fincon, and Swedcon, on the other hand, were formed 
specifically for UNFICYP duty and were demobilized
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after their tour (to be replaced by another ad hoc 
unit). Moreover, the Scandinavian contingents con­
sisted—except for senior officers—of reservists 
who had taken a temporary break in their civilian 
pursuits to volunteer for UNFICYP duty. The Irish 
contingents followed yet another pattern. Like the 
other English-speaking contingents, Ircon consisted 
of career regular soldiers, but like the Scandinavian 
contingents, it was an ad hoc volunteer unit formed 
specifically for a six-month tour in Cyprus.
A seventh national force, though not of contingent 
size, was the Austrian Field Hospital (AFH). The 
AFH was a 50-man military unit, including nine 
erstwhile civilian medical doctors and dentists 
fulfilling their Austrian military obligations. The 
AFH had the responsibility of treating UNFICYP 
soldiers whose ailments (or wounds in the event of 
combat) could not be handled by national contingent 
medical officers. The AFH also offered free dental 
care, a service of which great advantage was taken 
by UNFICYP personnel. Like the national contin­
gents, the AFH personnel also served a six-month tour 
of duty in Cyprus.
In addition to the nationally homogeneous six con­
tingents and Austrian Field Hospital, there were two 
multi-national military units in UNFICYP. One was 
the small 60-man Military Police Company consisting 
of soldiers drawn from each of the six national con­
tingents. «M.P. Coy» had jurisdiction over UNFI 
CYP soldiers outside the camps of their respective 
national contingents. The UNFICYP Military Police, 
however, had no powers of punishment; violators 
were returned to their national contingents for discip­
linary action.
With the exception of the Military Police Company, 
only Headquarters UNFICYP existed as a multi­
national unit. With its approximately 500-man com­
plement (about 50 officers and 450 other ranks), 
Headquarters was composed of representatives from 
each of the seven nations contributing to the United 
Nations military force in Cyprus. Both at the Head­
quarters offices and the Headquarters Officers Mess 
there was a genuine intermingling of disparate na­
tionalities. Even at Headquarters, however, the multi­
national representation was largely limited to staff 
officers; all seconded to UNFICYP from their home 
military establishments to serve minimum one-year 
tours in Cyprus. The supporting infrastructure and 
lower ranks of Headquarters UNFICYP was almost 
entirely a British affair. UN FICYP’slogistics,ordnance, 
workshops, air support, reconnaissance squadron, 
and transportation corps were closely allied with the 
British Sovereign Base Areas. These «S.B.A’s» were 
themselves a vast complex of preexisting British mili­
tary installations on Cyprus. That the logistical dif­
ficulties which had plagued other U.N. peacekeep­
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ing forces were minimal in Cyprus was due largely 
to UNFICYP’s material dependency on the support 
of S.B.A.’s.
collection of (lata
From October 1969 to May 1970,1 was in Cyprus 
doing full time research on UNFICYP. Owing to my 
credentials as an accredited correspondent and the 
cooperation of the U.N. Press Office, I was granted 
the status of «temporary official assignment» with 
UNFICYP. This allowed for my virtual complete 
access to all levels and ranks of UNFICYP military 
personnel. During the time of the field research, ex­
tended periods were spent with each of the national 
contingents, the Field Hospital, the Military Police 
Company, and Headquarters. In addition to formal 
interviews with 100 military officers (close to one- 
third of the entire UNFICYP officer complement), my 
findings are based on participant-observations in a 
variety of contexts: tactical situations, formal social 
affairs, informal gatherings, and perusal of UN 
FICYP documents and records.. The openness of 
UNFICYP to the probings of a visitor allowed for a 
wide ranging opportunity to examine the social or­
ganization of a peacekeeping force. Perhaps, in some 
ways, this researcher was able to get a more complete 
picture of the social dynamics of UNFICYP than 
many of its formal members.
sources οϊ conflict
The variety of theoretical schemes available to the 
analyst of formal organizations are legion. Yet when 
all is said and done, there are probably only two 
major conceptual approaches to the examination of 
concrete social organizations. One approach is to 
ascertain what are the stated goals of the organiza­
tion and then examine how much success or failure 
the organization has had in achieving these goals. 
The second perspective is to ascertain what are the 
kinds of differentiation within an organization and 
then examine the amount and types of conflict de­
riving from these internal cleavages. In this paper I 
have adopted the latter frame of reference.
There is the premise that the conflict approach can 
serve as an especially appropriate analytical frame­
work to describe all social organizations. It does net 
imply that UNFICYP was a notably conflict ridden 
organization, but it does mean that UNFICYP like 
any social organization had its own internal and ex­
ternal sources of social strain. It is by this elemental 
comprehension of the inherent conflict in a social 
structure that researchers can begin to determine the 
essential sociological makeup of the organization 
under analysis. What follows then is in no sense an
exposé of UNFICYP, but rather the application of 
a general form of social analyses to one particular 
formal organization.
Conflict between UNFICYP andthe UnitedNations 
Organization. Strain between the UNFICYP organ­
ization in Cyprus and the United Nations Organ­
ization (UNO) in New York was apparent on several 
counts. One major source of dissatisfaciiim with UNO 
revolved around the lack of funds appropriated to 
UNFICYP military expenditures.
A Headquarters staff officer: «This is the biggest 
penny pinching outfit you can imagine. The U.N. wastes 
millions on foolishness, and we can’t even buy a wide- 
angle camera. Can you imagine! For a few pennies 
they will jeopardize the success of the whole operation.»
A contingent commander: «New York is always 
trying to cut back on the money it sends here. Do they 
ever look at the extravagance of those sitting in air- 
conditioned offices in New York. The military side is 
the only thing in the whole United Nations running 
on a budget. UNFICYP has been the U.N.’s only 
bargain in value delivered.»
Another source of contention with UNO was the 
restrictions placed on the UNFICYP military in the 
performances of its mission.
A Canadian officer: «We’re sent here with our 
hands tied behind our backs. We’re like traffic cops, 
we can only wave our hands. The politicians won’t 
let us have any authority. If we could use a little 
muscle, this whole mess would be over in two weeks.»
A Danish officer: «Ralph Bunche made his biggest 
mistake when he backed down after the Agreements 
[i.e. establishing the status quo in Cyprus] were made. 
Since then the Cyps can push us all over the place. 
We should never have lost the right of complete free­
dom of movement. Politics overrode military con­
siderations and pushed back the chances of ever 
getting peace here.»
A Finnish officer: «An officer’s first responsibility 
is the safety of his men. This the U.N. has taken away 
from us. Here we are nothing more than a toothless 
paper tiger. We are supposed to be peacekeepers. 
That’s why they gave us these bullet-proof hats 
[pointing derisively at the blue beret of UNFICYP].»
A Swedish officer: «New York is always fouling 
us up. Anytime we want do something positive we 
have to clear it upstairs where somebody will find 
a reason to turn us down. You know what the U.N. 
is? It’s like two elephants fucking. Lots of noise, 
grunts, and groans, and shit on the ground. Then it 
takes 24 months to see what comes out.»
Conflict between UNFICYP and the home military 
establishments of contributing nations. Because of the 
nature of the recruiting system—men seconded and
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units temporarily assigned to Cyprus from their home 
armies—UNFICYP often found itself at odds with 
the military establishments of contributing nations. 
Most of this strain centered around assignment of 
military personnel to the Headquarters UNFICYP 
staff. Whether or not an officer’s tour would be ex­
tended depended ultimately on decisions made back 
in his home country’s defense ministry. In one in­
stance brought to my attention, a certain staff of­
ficer sought to extend his Cyprus tour and was en­
couraged to do so by UNFICYP. He was nevertheless 
reassigned home in the wake of a small imbroglio. 
The aftermath was that the officer and his supporters 
felt that UNFICYP had not supported his case with 
sufficient vigor, while his home military establish­
ment perceived UNFICYP as meddling in standard 
assignment practises. Needless to add, the officer’s 
standing in his own national army was compromised 
(he resigned shortly after returning home).
There was also the general question as to what 
effect assignment to Cyprus had on the military 
careers of UNFICYP’s serving officers. On this issue 
there were mixed views. Some believed U.N. duty 
offered an opportunity to demonstrate personal capa­
bilities in an operational force, while others felt that 
absence from the mainstream of military advance­
ment at home was detrimental to their military 
futures. The latter possibility, of course, could be a 
serious source of organizational strain. In either 
event, the elemental fact was that UNFICYP was an 
anomalous military structure: an officer served in a 
centrally commanded international force, but the 
power of permanent assignment and promotion rested 
in his home military organization. This meant that 
no matter what an officer’s personal commitment to­
ward a U.N. peacekeeping force might be, he knew 
that in both the short and long run his career ad­
vancement depended entirely on how he was evaluated 
within his own national army.
A Canadian officer: «Well it’s hard to tell what 
would be better for my career. Being in Cyprus 
doesn’t hurt it any. But it would be better to have a 
battalion back home. No question about that. U.N. 
duty is like pulling a long T.D.Y. [temporary duty 
assignment].»
A Swedish officer: «Because we don’t have a stand­
ing army, it is very important to be close to Stockholm 
to help your career. Promotions are so hard to man­
age, that you can easily lose out when you are re­
moved from the powers that be. You can be forgotten 
if you are too far away from home.»
Conflict between Headquarters UNFICYP and na­
tional contingents. Much of the conflict between 
Headquarters UNFICYP and the national contin­
gents was similar to that usually found between
headquarters and line units in any military organ­
ization. There were criticisms by the national contin­
gents that Headquarters was over-staffed and overly 
bureaucratic, or that it failed to take the contingents 
into account when policies were changed. For ex­
ample, when the national contingents were redeploy­
ed in the spring of 1970 (in anticipation of a forth­
coming reduction in UNFICYP strength), there was 
contingent resentment at the need to move out of es­
tablished areas and be relocated in new surroundings.
A Danish officer: «It will be disasterous to move 
the contingents around. It takes years to get to know 
the local situation and who is who in both Greek 
and Turk sides. If Headquarters is thinking about 
cutting back, the first place to start should be at 
Headquarters. The men in the contingents are work­
ing full-time seven days a week, at Headquarters 
they work half-days five days a week.»
A Finnish officer: «The way redeployment has been 
handled, I think a Finn corporal could do a better 
job running UNFICYP. We hear stories of when 
we will move or where we will go. But we cannot 
know anything for sure. We are confused when we 
hear such different stories.»
But certain aspects of the conflict between Head­
quarters and the national contingents were unique to 
UNFICYP. The use of English as the official language 
necessarily placed the non-English speaking units at a 
disadvantage. There was also the recurrent feeling 
at the contingent level that national interests were 
being slighted at headquarters.
A Danish officer: «No matter how many people 
we have who know English, we are still handicapped 
by not being native speakers. And it also takes us 
a much longer time to prepare reports. They are too 
particular at Headquarters on correct grammatical 
English and spelling.»
A Swedish officer: «Lots of wonder why they are 
not more Swedes at Headquarters. Count them. 
We don’t have as many as the others. You must 
always have somebody looking out for your interests 
at Headquarters, or they will run you over.»
A Canadian officer: «In that report [of the 1969 
Economic Committee of UNFICYP] there was no 
mention that Canada is paying its own way. There are 
a lot of Canadians at home who would be damn 
mad if they knew we weren’t getting the credit we 
deserve. Why Headquarters didn’t bring this to 
their attention has bothered a lot of us. UNFICYP 
is a thankless job for Canada.»
Another vantage point illustrates a different kind 
of conflict between a Headquarters unit and the 
national contingents.
An officer in the Military Police Company: «We 
have a hell of a problem trying to get cooperation 
from the contingents. The Irish and the British try
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to keep control over their own M.P.’s even though 
they are assigned to M.P. Coy. Another case. Just 
after I arrived, I had to send a Finn M.P. back to 
Fincon because he couldn’t do the job. I mean he 
was lazy, mean, and dumb. To make matters worse 
he couldn’t even say hello in English. Six months 
later Fincon is supposed to send us another man. 
They send back the same guy, only this time he’s a 
sergeant. Now we’re stuck with an absolute fuck-all 
who outranks my good men.»
Conflict between national contingents within UN 
FICYP. One would expect differences between the 
national contingents would be a major source of 
conflict within UNFICYP. In fact there was such 
conflict, but the bulk of the inter-contingent strain 
derived from organizational features peculiar to 
UNFICYP rather than hostilities between national­
ities per se. One such organizational tension was 
over the division of labor within UNFICYP.
A Swedish officer: «We can pull our maintenance 
on our vehicles, but we must send them to Dhekelia 
[in the S.B.A.’s]. This means the work is done slower 
and not as well as we could do it. But, of course, 
this is to give the Brits at Dhekelia a job. They have 
to find something for them to do. The Brits are using 
the U.N. for their own purposes.»
An Austrian officer: «The report [of the 1969 
Economic Committee on UNFICYP] was unfair in 
the way it computed costs. This made the Field 
Hospital look bad compared to the British base 
hospitals. The report did not mention the work the 
Field Hospital is doing on dental treatment, out­
patient care, and taking care of UNCIVPOL. The 
Chief Medical Officer at Headquarters was a Brit 
and he fixed the report to make us look bad and the 
S.B.A.’s good. The Brits are trying to get UNFICYP 
to use the British hospitals and close down the Field 
Hospital.»
Another organizational strain centered on the 
quite real differences in the pay scales of the various 
contingents. On this score the British in particular 
had cause for resentment. Alone of the national 
contingents, Britcon received no special U.N. pay 
allowances. Although most pronounced in Britcon, 
the differential in U.N. allowances was a source of 
resentment for other nationalities as well. These al­
lowances—paid for from United Nations funds were 
in addition to base salaries paid for by home military 
establishments—were highest for the Swedes and 
Danes: approximately $330 U.S. monthly for of­
ficers, and $100 U.S. monthly for other ranks. 
(See appendix 3 for pay schedules of UNFICYP 
military personnel.)
A British officer: «How do you think my men feel. 
A British soldier makes £10 a week and a Swede two
miles down the road makes £30 a week for doing 
exactly the same thing. How do I explain to my men 
about making the world safe for peacekeeping. They 
want to know why they’re not getting paid what that 
Swede is getting paid. And I don’t know what to 
tell him myself.»
A British officer: «We had a British captain at 
Headquarters who found that his Danish driver 
was earning twice as much as he was. We feel like 
poor relations here. Even when we go to Cancon 
they do the treating because they know we don’t 
have any money.»
An Irish officer: «The pay of the U.N. forces here 
is the biggest military secret in the United Nations. 
But we all know that the Swedes and Danes are 
making a killing. But it’s one of those things we 
don’t talk about too much or the lads would begin 
to get uneasy.»
A Finnish officer: «A Danish reserve major in 
Cyprus makes £100 more a month than I do, and he 
isn’t even a soldier. But he will never tell you the 
truth about how much he makes here.»
Although often in a humorous vein, there was also 
some inter-contingent asperity of a more chauvinistic 
nature reflected in negative stereotypes acquired in 
Cyprus.
An Irish sergent: «Sure we can speak English with 
the Canadians, but my god, they’re a rowdy bunch. 
Nobody likes a drink and a good time more than an 
Irishman, but those Canadians are something else 
again. They get loud too early, if you get what I mean.»
A Danish officer: «When we took over Xeros from 
the Irish, you couldn’t believe the filth there was. 
These Irish aren’t civilized. The first thing we did 
was kill millions of cockroaches. Millions and mil­
lions of them. We made mountains out of them and 
burned them. They even spoke Irish. The Irish were 
with those cockroaches for four years and lived 
together like one big family.»
Genuine hostility between nationalities, however, 
was rare. And in those cases where it was present, 
the animosity had origins long preceding UNFICYP 
assignment; most notably, that of many Irish toward 
the British, and a few British toward the Austrians.
An Irish officer: «Let’s face facts. Anti-British 
feeling is ingrained in the Irish temperament. We 
Irish are cursed with long memories, maybe that’s 
because we don’t have much else. Even here in Cyprus 
a lot of the lads can’t forget what the British did to 
their families not so long ago.»
An Irish officer: «We just don’t talk politics with 
the English. It’s better that way, because a lot of us 
couldn’t control ourselves once we start talking and 
thinking about the old days and what’s going on up 
North right now. It’s a miracle there hasn’t been a 
good punch-up between us yet.»
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A British officer: «Don’t forget all the top Aus­
trian officers were Nazis. They run the Field Hospital 
just like a stalag. One of their officers can get damn 
obnoxious once he gets a few drinks in him. That’s 
when he starts complaining ‘why can’t I wear my 
[German] medals. I won them in honor.’ It’s hard 
enough to forget the War without him always re­
minding us.»
By far, however, the most frequent point of dis­
putation between the national contingents involved 
invidious comparisons of their respective military 
prowess and organizational effectiveness.
A Danish officer: «The British have an army jo 
solve their unemployment problem. The Black Watch 
aren’t soldiers, they’re lumberjacks and timbermen 
from Canada. These are men who can’t make a living 
at home and bring their troubles into the Army.»
A Swedish officer: «Our men are not collected 
from the slums of their countries. They are volun­
teers who have been carefully picked. They are the 
cream of the crop and a much higher grade of men 
than you would find in a regular group of soldiers. 
Just compare their intelligence and manners with the 
Brits and the Irish and the Canadians.»
A Canadian officer: «The Canadians and British 
are the only real soldiers here. The Irish are a sloppy 
army. The Danes and Finns are really civilians in 
uniform here for a vacation in the sun. The Swedes 
with their beards and necklaces are a hippy army.»
A British officer: «How can you seriously compare 
a unit like the Pompadours with the others except the 
Black Watch. We and the Canadians are an army. The 
others are a mixed batch of civilian tourists, half-sol­
diers, and a few professionals who never fought a war.»
Conflict between different components within the same 
nationalities. In some ways conflict within the na­
tional groups represented in UNFICYP was more 
noticeable than that between nationalities. Common 
to all contingents was a tension point introduced by 
the shortness of the six-month rotation cycle. Due to 
the brevity of a contingent’s tour, there was a tenden­
cy to let matters—especially housekeeping and main­
tenance standards—slide. Advance detachments of 
about-to-arrive contingents were thus often placed 
in the position of having to receipt property which 
was not always fully accounted for or in proper con­
dition. The conflict between departing and newly 
arriving units was manifest in the latter’s complaint 
that little had been done previously to beautify the 
compound area or establish adequate standard oper­
ating procedures. Each unit tended to see itself as 
«really the first to get things in shape». There were re­
peated remarks in all contingents along the lines of: 
«You can’t imagine how bad things were here before 
we came over.»
Another source of intra-contingent tension was 
applicable only to the Scandinavian units. The con­
tingents from Denmark, Finland, and Sweden had 
officer complements consisting of both reservists and 
career professionals. The reservists on temporary 
active duty were on «contract» for a specific UNFI 
CYP tour. Their pay was equal (and in the case of 
Dancon higher) to that of career officers of the same 
rank. Many of the professional officers viewed their 
reservist counterparts as being in Cyprus sheerly for 
a paid vacation. For their part, the reservists often saw 
the career officers as overly concerned with military 
formality and picayune discipline.
A Danish career officer: «The reserve officer comes 
here on contract to make some easy money and have 
a good time. He cares nothing about making the army 
run a little better because he is not part of it. You tell 
me what kind of army pays its amateurs more than 
professionals.»
A Swedish reserve officer: «You can write a whole 
book on what’s wrong with the Swedish Army. It 
is rigid and authoritarian. Men who would be fail­
ures in civilian life are on the top. It is only the re­
serve officer who brings initiative and common sense 
into a fossil system.»
Three of the nations contributing military units to 
UNFICYP—Austria, Denmark, Sweden—also con­
tributed civilian policemen to UNCIVPOL. The rela­
tionships between the UNCIVPOL policemen with 
their fellow nationals on the military side of UN 
FICYP was a curious blend of cordiality and calcu­
lation. Natural ties of common nationality in a foreign 
society were sometimes strained by questions of sen­
iority. On more than one occasion seemingly petty 
issues of protocol and precedence could lead to uncom­
fortable social situations.
An Austrian officer: «When the Austrian UN 
CIVPOL used to visit the Field Hospital there always 
was the problem of who should defer to who. They 
don’t come around much anymore.»
A Danish officer: «You quickly learn that the 
biggest nuisances can be your own countrymen. Some­
times we get a Dane policeman who thinks we are 
here to serve him. You can’t let them take advantage, 
or else they are always intruding where they are 
not wanted.»
The special situation of the British with their large 
military bases on Cyprus made for another kind of 
resentment. Athough relations between British serving 
in UNFICYP and the British military in the S.B. 
A.’s was not one of conflict, the Britcon soldier was 
hard pressed not to contrast his position unfavorably 
with that of British servicemen in the S.B.A.’s. The 
latter enjoyed more lenient pass privileges, more mod­
ern living accommodations, and a much greater array 
of post facilities. Thus the Britcon soldier suffered a
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sense of relative deprivation not only in comparison 
to his higher-paid UNFICYP counterparts but as 
well to his more privileged fellow nationals serving 
in Cyprus outside the United Nations.
A British sergeant: «Kitchner lived in this very camp 
in the 1880’s. And it hasn’t changed since, except that 
it’s more run down. Yet a few miles down the road 
are the most comfortable British barracks in the whole 
road [in the S.B.A.’s]. Britconis neither fish nor fowl. 
The British government cuts us off because we are part 
of UNFICYP. The United Nations cuts us off because 
we are part of the British Army in Cyprus.»
Conflict between military personnel and civilian staff 
within UNFICYP. Without doubt, the most struc­
tured conflict in UNFICYP was not between or within 
its constituent national forces, nor between different 
levels in the military hierarchy. Rather, the most evi­
dent strain was between UNFICYP military officers 
and the U.N. civilian staff in Cyprus. In one sense 
this was a restatement of the prevalent belief on the 
part of UNFICYP officers that the civilians taff—in 
Cyprus along with UNO in New York—was letting 
erroneous political considerations stand in the way 
of military effectiveness.
A Danish officer: «In 1967 the Dancon commander 
went down to an O.P. on the Green Line where a 
Danish soldier had been disarmed by some Turkish 
fighters. He went down there with an automatic 
weapon and waved it at the Turks. He threatened to 
shoot the whole bunch right there on the spot. It 
worked. But it got the commander into a lot of trou­
ble with the civilians back at Headquarters. They 
were out of their minds. But that is the kind of offi­
cer I would want to serve under. An officer’s first 
responsibility is to look after the safety of his men. 
How can you bring peace if your men don’t respect 
you? This is what the civilian mind will never under­
stand.»
An Irish officer: «Α little while back there was a 
Finn soldier who was shot at from a Greek village. 
The Finns drove up their armored cars and threaten­
ed to shoot the whole village right then and there if 
there was another shooting. This was the only cor­
rect thing to do. Otherwise the Cyps think you’re 
free game. You have to protect your men above ali 
else. But the Fincon commander was in serious trou­
ble after that. The Headquarters civilians really took 
after him. ‘No, no, no. You can’t touch a hair on a 
Cypriot.’ But I’d do the same thing.»
But beyond the almost pro forma complaints of the 
inadequacy of the civilian support given military com­
manders, there were numerous other tensions be­
tween military personnel and civilian staff within 
UNFICYP. These tensions derived from differences 
in social background, organizational authority, and
socio-political attitudes. Indeed, the differentiation 
between the two groups made UNFICYP a kind of 
microcosm of the civil-military conflict long noted in 
independent state systems. Perhaps most apparent 
was the pervasive resentment of the UNFICYP offi­
cer corps toward the privileges and life styles of the 
U.N. civilian staff.
A Finnish officer: «The civilian staff are the aris­
tocrats of Cyprus. They live like diplomats while sol­
diers do all the dirty work and live in old buildings 
and tents. I used to believe in the United Nations and 
give donations to it. But not after coming here. They 
should give money to those soldiers on the Green Line 
and the O.P.’s who deserve it. Not to the high liv­
ing U.N. civilians.»
A British officer: «Just look at how a U.N. civilian 
lives and how a soldier lives. The Force Commander’s 
driver is [U.N.] field service. He makes as much as 
a British colonel. It’s on up the line the same way. 
They have duty free liquor and throw posh parties for 
the rest of the diplomatic corps in Cyprus. The whole 
diplomatic corps is in this Cyprus thing together.»
Compounding the military’s displeasure with the 
particular life styles of the civilian staff in Cyprus, 
there was a generalized resentment of what was 
thought to be a deepseated civilian arrogance and 
condescension toward military personnel. On the 
part of some UNFICYP serving officers, there was 
even an ultimate questioning of the very morality 
of the civilian staff in their peacekeeping role.
A Swedish officer: «Ralph Bunche—we call him 
«bunk»—detests soldiers. This is true of almost all 
U.N. administrative staff including that in Cyprus. It 
starts from the very top. We soldiers are a different 
breed to them. The big problem in the U.N. is racism. 
Not the usual kind, but civilian racism against the 
military. But we soldiers are like women. The U.N. 
can’t lhe with us, but can’t do without us.»
An Irish officer: «The administrative staff of the 
U.N. is a closed circle. It resents newcomers—espe­
cially if they are military. Once I had to deal with a 
U.N. official from New York who had been a corpo­
ral in the army. He hated officers no matter what 
their nationality. No matter what any officer said to 
improve UNFICYP we could hear him thinking ‘what 
does that idiot in a uniform know’. That was a com­
plicated situation.»
A Canadian officer: «You must remember that 
while we change every six months, the civilians stay on 
and on and on. This gives them a chance to dig in. 
They have their lives invested in this operation. If 
peace comes what would they do? You know the U.N. 
types, good at languages and not much anything else. 
Smooth and glib, but with no place to go home to. 
Men between countries. They live like ambassadors. 
The easiest way to save money for the U.N. is to
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take away the limousines and big apartments of the 
U.N. officials here. What’s keeping us here is the 
civilians wanting to keep this thing going and milk 
it for all its worth.»
The underlying resentment of many UNFICYP 
military officers toward the U.N. civilian staff took 
one notable form in the rather frequent, and always 
favorable, mentions of Major General Carl von Horn. 
A Swedish career officer, von Horn had an impres­
sive background in various peacekeeping activities, 
including command of the U.N. forces in the Congo. 
Von Horn had subsequently written a book scathingly 
critical of the U.N. civilian leadership. By a coinciden­
tal circumstance von Horn was living in retirement 
in Cyprus at the time of my field research. Although 
he was persona non grata in U.N. official circles—in 
and out of Cyprus—there were circumspect, if not sub­
terraneous, informal contacts between von Horn and 
some UNFICYP military officers. But the comments 
given below were typical of many UNFICYP officers 
who had never personally met von Horn.
A Finnish officer: «Soldiers are always looked upon 
by the civilian staff as an inevitable evil. The military 
is something dirty for U.N. officials. This is what von 
Horn told so well in his book. If you see him, tell him 
he has many secret admirers in UNFICYP. He knows 
how soldiers are made to feel like second-class citizens 
by U.N. officials. We have three enemies in Cyprus, you 
know: the Greeks, the Turks, and the U.N. civilians.»
A British officer: «Von Horn wrote what a lot of us 
feel. Only we can’t so publicly. But somebody had to 
blow the whistle on what these U.N. civilians are doing 
to the military. Von Horn is a sort ofunderground hero 
to a lot of officers who’ve been in the U.N.»
A Danish officer: «There was this big stink last 
year. Von Horn had been invited to attend a Swedcon 
party. After all he was a retired major general in the 
Swedish Army and had many friends in Swedcon. 
When the U.N. civilians arrived at the party and saw 
von Horn there, they refused to sit down and be­
came very nasty. A British officer who tried to smooth 
things over was accused of supporting von Horn and 
betraying the U.N. The civilian staff saw to it that 
he was quickly sent back to England.»
organizational conflict: U.N. peacekeeping 
vis-a-vis national military forces
A more complete assessment of the sources of con­
flict found in UNFICYP requires that they be eval­
uated in terms of whether they are unique to United 
Nations peacekeeping forces (as typified by UNFI 
CYP), or whether they are general to military organ­
izations in the main (as represented by mono-nation­
al military establishments). This is done in the com­
parisons given in Chart 1. The structured strains
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noted in UNFICYP—both civil military and intra­
military—are categorized as to whether they are:
(a) applicable to most or all military organizations,
(b) characteristic of most or all military organiza­
tions, but especially evident in U.N. peacekeeping for­
ces, and (c) characteristically found only in U.N. 
peacekeeping forces.
One set of conflicts was that seemingly generic to 
military organization, inclusive of UNFICYP. Thus 
in civil-military relationships there was the dissatis­
faction of UNFICYP military personnel with the 
amount of funds and kinds of facilities allotted for 
military purposes by civilian authorities. On this 
score certainly, neither its multi-national membership 
nor its peacekeeping mission excluded UNFICYP 
from one endemic source of complaint on the part 
of armed forces establishments.
Within the military organization of UNFICYP it­
self, there were the tensions between staff and line 
units, between reserve officers and career officers, 
and between officers and lower ranks. Again these 
kinds of UNFICYP strains were organizationally akin 
to virtually all national armies.
On a second level, there were the conflicts char­
acteristic of all or most military organizations, but 
especially evident in UNFICYP. The political re­
strictions placed by civilian authorities on field com­
manders in their use of force have often been a 
source of contention in civil-military relationships. 
However, the novel nature of the peacekeeping mis­
sion—the very raison d'être of UNFICYP—placed 
especially heavy strains on the traditionally trained 
United Nations military personnel in Cyprus. Simi­
larly, civil-military relations in national military es­
tablishments are often characterized by the military’s 
resentment of the higher living standards of civilian 
officials. Such resentment is aggravated by the mil­
itary’s perception of civilian arrogance and conde­
scension toward military personnel. These frequent 
sore points in standard civil-military relationships 
were exasperated in UNFICYP due to the smallness 
of the force and the resultant close interaction and 
observation between its military officers and civil­
ian staff. Moreover, in most cases, the living and 
working conditions (but not pay) of UNFICYP mili­
tary personnel were of a lower order than was the 
case in their home countries.
On the same level of conflicts prevalent in most mil­
itary organizations but more notable in UNFICYP 
were certain intra-military factors. A prime quality 
of much of the UNFICYP subculture centered in the 
invidious comparisons made between the UNFICYP 
contingents as to their respective military prowess, 
recruitment policies, and organizational merits. Al­
though these comparisons were in fact based on real 
differences within UNFICYP, similar parallels can
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Chart 1. Levels of Conflict in Military Organizations : Comparisons of U.N. Peacekeeping with National Military Forces
Generality of Conflict
Source of Conflict:
Civil-Military Relations
Source of Conflict:
Intra-Military Factors
characteristic of most or all military 
organizations, whether national or
U.N. peacekeeping forces
military resentment of lack of funds 
appropriated for its use
staff vs. line
reserve vs. career personnel 
officers vs. lower ranks
characteristic of most or all military 
organizations, but more evident in
U.N. peacekeeping forces
political restrictions on military’s use 
of force
military’s perception of life styles of 
associated civilian officials 
military’s perception of arrogance and con­
descension of associated civilian officials
division of labor
invidious comparisons of military 
prowess by constituent units
characteristically found only in U.N. 
peacekeeping forces
power of assignment /promotion residing 
in other than operational unit 
official language other than that of some 
units
pay differences between national units 
negative stereotypes between national units
be found within mono-national armed forces; namely, 
conflict between services and between elite forces and 
regular units. The division-of-labor squabbles between 
certain UNFICYP units and the British bases were 
in one sense unique to the Cyprus operation. But 
in another manner these were again similar to inter­
service jurisdictional rivalries within single national 
military establishments.
On a third level was the set of conflicts normally 
absent in national militaries but characteristic of U.N. 
peacekeeping operations as typified by UNFICYP. 
None of the observed civil-military conflicts fell 
into this category. Rather, the strains peculiar to 
UNFICYP lay in its internal military organization. 
There was the apparently unavoidable difficulty 
resulting from the official use of a language which 
placed about half of the UNFICYP military personnel 
at varying degrees of disadvantage.4 That some neg­
ative stereotypes of other national units existed— 
whether preexistent or acquired in Cyprus—seem­
ed likewise unavoidable. More serious, however, 
than either linguistic hurdles or unfavorable national 
images were the pay discrepancies between constit­
uent national components. Whether due to initially 
higher base salaries received from home military es­
tablishments or the system of U.N. allowances for 
Cyprus duty, the resentment of the lower toward
4. The command of English among non-native speakers in 
UNFICYP was very impressive, nevertheless. My estimates of 
the proportion who could speak fair to excellent English was:
officers other ranks
Austrians 90% 20%
Finns 20% 5%
Danes 70% 30%
Swedes 80% 40%
the higher remunerated was a pervasive source of 
tension within UNFICYP.
Another conflict unique to U.N. peacekeeping forces 
was found in the relationship between UNFICYP 
and its contributing national military establishments. 
This was the structured strain resulting from the 
organizational separation of the power of assignment 
and promotion from the operational unit in which 
an officer served (i.e. between the officer’s national 
army and UNFICYP). In other words, unlike service 
in the standard armed forces where duty and promo­
tion /assignment are under the same chain of command, 
service in UNFICYP offered no permanent assign­
ment nor any sort of advancement through United Na­
tions channels. Indeed, UNFICYP duty could turn out 
to be a discontinuity in a military career path at home.
As is probably apparent, the organizational con­
flicts unique to U.N. peacekeeping forces do not neces­
sarily derive from their peacekeeping mission per se. 
The strains resulting from differences in language, 
inter-unit national stereotyping, discrepant pay scales, 
and the intermesh of career paths alternating be­
tween international and home military assignments are 
also those similarly inherent in other multi-national 
commands. At the same time, the distinctive tensions 
emanating from the multi-national aspects of UN 
FICYP overlay other more basic conflicts typically 
found in mono-national military organizations. Thus, 
UNFICYP, along with its being the first major «suc­
cess» in U.N. peacekeeping operations, displayed or­
ganizational qualities with ample precedent in con­
ventional military structures.
We conclude then by reiterating a cardinal point 
made earlier in this essay. The use of a conflict frame­
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work as an interpretive variable does not stigma­
tize UNF1CYP as especially rent by strife. Indeed, 
the emphasis on conflict given in the description of 
UNFICYP has purposefully distorted reality by ob­
scuring the countervailing tendencies toward consen­
sus also existing in UNFICYP. But it is to say that 
like all organizations UNFICYP was no exception in 
possessing external and internal sources of conflict; 
and it is in the comprehension of these conflicts
that much of the underlying structure of UNFICYP 
is revealed. Moreover, the conflicts of UNFICYP 
were in the main common to all military organiza­
tions with the added strains peculiar to multi-national 
forces. Finally, and perhaps most important, if and 
when the United Nations is employed as a peace­
keeping force in other locales and crises, the sources 
of organizational conflict found in the UNFICYP 
case will almost certainly be recapitulated.
Appendix 1. Organization Chart of UNFICYP
EME : Electrical Mech. Engineers
Appendix 2. UNFICYP Military Personnel by Assignment and Nationality (January, 1970)
Assignment
Nationality:
Austria Canada Denmark Finland Ireland Sweden U.K. Total
Headquarters Staff 1 29 8 5 6 6 128 183
Headquarters Supporting Units
---- - — — — — 318 318Military Police Company 17 19 7 4 10 8 65
Field Hospital 52 — — — — — 52
National Contingents — 536 475 465 409 397 609 2,891
Total 53 582 502 477 419 413 1,063 3,509
Appendix 3. Estimated Monthly Gross Pay of UNFICYP Military Personnel in Selected Ranks ( January, 1970, in U.S. dollars)*
Country Private or Lowest Rank Captain . Country Private or Lowest Rank Captain
Austria
Canada
Denmark
Finland
240 (150) 
400 (35) 
440 (100) 
280 (80)
640 (400) Great Britain 120 ( — ) 330 ( —)
860 (80) Ireland 145 (65) 370 (100)
780 (330) Sweden 480 (100) 890 (330)
690 (170)
Note: Monthly UNFICYP allowances given in parentheses. Base pay from national array can be computed by subtracting UNFICYP allow­
ances from total gross. * Based on unofficial sources.
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